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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ANTHONY DION HEANEY, : BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
HANK GALETKA, 
Respondent/Appellee. Case No. 20000959-CA 
NATURE OF APPEAL AND BASIS OF JURISDICTION 
Anthony Dion Heaney appeals the trial court's denial of his Petition for 
Extraordinary Relief and the grant of Hank Galetka's Motion for Summary Judgement. 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(f) (1999). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court, following established law, correctly conclude that Utah 
prison facilities are not required to treat inmates incarcerated in Utah 
pursuant to the Interstate Corrections Compact (ICC), differently than Utah 
treats its own inmates? 
2. Did the trial court, following established law, correctly conclude that a 
Montana stipulation regarding the treatment of inmates incarcerated in 
Montana, is not a binding document as to the treatment of Montana inmates 
incarcerated in Utah pursuant to the ICC? 
3. Did the trial court, following established law, correctly conclude that 
Heaney's Eighth Amendment rights are not violated where his extensive 
safety concerns necessitate housing him in the most secure area of the 
prison, consequently not affording him the same privileges afforded inmates 
housed in the general prison population? 
4. Did the trial court, following established law, correctly conclude that where 
Heaney's prison placement is a matter of prison administration, that it was 
not the court's prerogative to direct that placement? 
The standard of review for questions of constitutional law, State v. Martinez, 896 
P.2d 38, 39 (Utah App. 1995), like all conclusions of law, is correctness. State v. Riggs, 
1999 UT App 271, H 7. 
RELEVANT PROVISIONS 
Any relevant statutes or rules will be quoted in the text. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Heaney, a Montana state inmate, is incarcerated at the Utah State Prison (prison) 
pursuant to the Interstate Corrections Compact (ICC). (R. 12). The ICC provides that 
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"[a]n inmate must request a transfer in writing before such a transfer can be made 
pursuant to Article IV." Utah Code Ann. § 77-28a-l, Art. XI. (1999). Heaney alleges, 
however, that without "any prior notice" he was transferred to Utah. See Heaney's Brief, 
p.6. He alleges that in Montana he had protective custody status, and that pursuant to a 
Montana stipulation dealing with protective custody inmates, that Utah must provide him 
with the same conditions afforded protective custody inmates housed in Montana. (R. 12-
14). Heaney also alleges his Eighth Amendment rights are violated where he is not 
provided the same privileges as the general prison population, due to his being housed in 
a maximum security area, pursuant to his extensive safety concerns. (R. 13). 
To ensure inmate safety a "safety management policy" has been instituted by the 
prison. See Addendum 1, "Affidavit of Clint Friel," at p. 2. (R. 60). Pursuant to this 
policy during intake and orientation an inmate is asked to identify any safety concerns he 
has with regard to other inmates, including names and why these individuals present a 
safety concern. Id. This information is verified if possible, however, an inmate's safety 
concerns are given considerable credibility. Id. 
Heaney's identified purported safety concerns are extensive, and he made Utah 
prison officials aware of those concerns. See Addendum 2, "Inmate Safety Concerns." 
(R. 64). Names provided by the inmate are entered into a computer data base, and this 
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information then appears on the inmate's "safety screen." See Addendum 1, "Affidavit of 
Clint Friel," at p.2. (R. 60). This screen assures that an inmate's safety concerns are 
considered before housing assignments are made. Id. These "safety concerns" remain in 
the data base until the inmate notifies the prison that they no longer exist. Id. 
Where a large number of the inmate population presents a safety concern to an 
inmate, it becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible, to keep essentially the entire 
prison population separate from the inmate at all times. Id. The only workable solution 
in this instance is to remove the inmate from the general population. Id. This is 
accomplished by housing the inmate in the maximum security area of the prison. Id. at p. 
3. (R. 61). Facilities in this area provide for either single cell housing, or housing with an 
approved roommate. Id. The cells in the maximum security unit are the largest ones 
available at the prison. Id. 
It is of vital interest and need that the prison utilizes this type of "structural 
intervention." Id. The prison presently houses approximately five thousand plus inmates, 
and the management of such a large population, especially with regard to inmates with 
broad base safety concerns, requires such intervention in order to assure that the prison 
protects these inmates. Id. 
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Ii in lates vs ith safety cone erns : i i the maximum security unit are housed separately 
from other inmates on that unit. Id. In order to maintain .md manage the unit, however, 
all of the inmates are subject to the same restriction" '. 'i viicg^ diiicreneeb between 
inmates housed in the maximi im security ar ea of th 
prison's funeral pnpuLumn are based on valid security r and institutional considerations. 
Id. ^ '•• • ' 
Maximum security inmates are allowed fewer commissary purchases than general 
"onuV .. ;. inmates , IILSJI.IIIIN IS based nn illlit • iil H 
1
 ? - area of the prison, where more 
commissary purchases translate to more available contraband, which in turn translates to 
greater security threats to both inmates and staff 1<I I "his consideration applies with 
noiisnii HI (Ins aiisi hi „n p i (Is! u?). 
Maximum security inmates have fewer telephone and visiting privileges than 
general population inmates. Id. This disparity is based on the aduiuoiiai manpower 
reqi lii edto facilitate these pi i\ ilcges lui llii IIMMIIIIIIII saait', iinn.iti \i Svi urily 
necessitates heav\, increased supervision tun anv unt-of-cell time accorded a maximum 
s e c u r i t y | I i m a t e > jci similar manpower is not necessary for the general population 
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inmates to be accorded the same privileges. Id. Once again, this consideration bears 
equally on administrative segregation inmates as well as safety concern inmates. Id. 
In certain areas of the maximum security section inmates are allowed out of their 
cells in their section three hours in every 24-hour period. Id. Such limited out-of-cell 
time is necessary to assure inmate safety, due to these inmates heightened security and 
safety concerns. Id. 
The prison has an institutional interest in maintaining the maximum security area 
of the prison as a less appealing housing area. Id. Due to the increased safety concerns 
presented, operating costs in this housing area are accordingly higher. Id. The prison has 
an institutional interest in assuring only inmates legitimately requiring such increased 
supervision are housed on this unit. Id. Heaney presents extensive safety concerns, 
which pursuant to policy necessitate that he is assigned housing in a maximum security 
area of the prison to assure his protection. Id. at p. 4-5. (R. 62-63). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Utah is not required to treat ICC inmates differently than it treats its own 
inmates. The ICC mandates that all inmates confined pursuant to the Compact "shall be 
treated equally with such similar inmates of the receiving state as may be confined in the 
same institution." Utah Code Ann. § 77-28a-l, Art. IV(e) (1999). Accordingly, this 
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( "oiitl, 111 (i Vn'i, i" Jolden, l td II ll'liii! innfllin tin'* H V , iiiiiii ,m iniplni irnl int ronlmrl ,ii iv.ur 
there, necessitated Utah applying the sending state's disciplinary, classification, visitation 
and groomingpolici.es. 889 P.2d 1389, 1392 (Utah App. 1995). The trial court's reliance 
on this established iaw was proper in holding that Utah is not required to treat ICC 
in in 11 it i.iU ' different I \ llhii in ml linrjk ii1 mvi in mi 1111 m iic 
u iah is not bound by a Montana stipulation regarding the t reatmen. ^ 
Montana protective custody inmates. Clearly established case law holds that Heaney 
has no "rights" " ' to placement in any particular prison fa.cil.it> , Ol im v W akineL, L... .' -
584 F.2d 352, 355-356 (10t! l Cir. 1978), to any particular prison classification, Hew in \\ 
Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 46K (1083). or lo programs and privileges associated with si ich. 
2 empleman v. Gunter, 16 I ".3d 36 / , 3 ; C • (1 : ; j: " Cii I S 9 1); J i i sk >; i i Gammon, 9 78 I \2d 
Heaney's Utah housing does not deprive him of any such "rights" under the ICC. Even if 
Montana's stipulation,, were somehow seen as providing Heaney w ith "rights/' those 
rights are dependent on 1 lis being incarcerated in Montana. S e >e Jennings v. Lombardi. J 0 
I l ii < 'U, <•)% (Kfh H i , 1WS). . , 
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Most importantly, the ICC's mandated equality of treatment precludes 
implementation of the Montana stipulation to Heaney while incarcerated in Utah, a 
necessary stance to assure equality of treatment between ICC inmates and similarly 
situated Utah inmates. See Glick, 889 P.2d at 1392. Strong policy considerations support 
this position. Id. at 1393 n.6. 
The trial court's reliance on this established law was proper in holding that Utah is 
not bound by a Montana stipulation regarding the treatment of Montana protective 
custody inmates. 
Heaney's Eighth Amendment rights have not been violated. The vast majority 
of courts, including the First, Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, hold that no Eighth 
Amendment violation exists where an inmate with extensive safety concerns is housed in 
a more secure area of the prison where he is not afforded the same privileges as the 
general prison population. Lovell v. Brennan, 566 F.Supp. 672, 690-91 (D.Me. 1983), 
aff'd, 728 F.2d 560 (1st Cir. 1984); Taylor v. Rogers, 781 F.2d 1047, 1050 (4th Cir. 1986); 
French v. Owens, 111 F.2d 1250, 1256 (7th Cir. 1985), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 817 (1986); 
Hosna v. Groose, 80 F.3d 298, 301 (8th Cir. 1996). cert, denied, 519 U.S. 860 (1996). 
The trial court's reliance on this established law was proper in holding that Heaney's 
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kighlh Amnidmuil li'jjih had mini! hrrn vinlitni IM, IIMIISIIM' liiiiii in I he nuximum security 
area of the prison due to his extensive safety concerns. 
Heaney's prison placement is a matter of prison administration, which is not 
within the Court's prerogatn* ,- - i .*. . ^ .• ' 
\ iiiiliutK.vI lluil (iii'i HI tidiiiiiii 4 •- discretion in the 
management of prisons, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979), and that appropriate 
deference and flexibility should he afforded those administrators trying to manage caw* 
aiidirs in what t^  i\v nature, a ^, .u.i^ w./. * •. •«. -
, . . - - i >ara>\ \ prison 
placement is a matter of prison administration, presenting exactly the sort of discretionary 
administrative decision rightfully within the expertise of correctional officials, rather than 
the court. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT, FOLLOWING ESTABLISHED 
LAW, CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT UTAH 
PRISONS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO TREAT INMATES 
INCARCERATED IN UTAH PURSUANT TO THE ICC 
DIFFERENTLY THAN UTAH TREATS ITS OWN 
INMATES. 
This Court addressed almost this exact issue in Glick v. Holden. 889 P.2d 1389 
(Utah App. 1995). There, an Arkansas inmate compacted to Utah, where he was 
classified at a higher security classification than in Arkansas, his visitation was more 
limited than in Arkansas, he was not allowed to grow a mustache or style his hair as he 
pleased as he had in Arkansas, and he was disciplined in accord with Utah's rather than 
Arkansas' policies. Id. at 1390. In a well-reasoned opinion, this Court held that neither 
the ICC, nor an implementing contract with Arkansas, necessitated Utah applying 
Arkansas' disciplinary, classification, visitation, or grooming policies. Id. at 1393. 
As here, the Arkansas inmate relied on the ICC provision stating that he should 
not be deprived "of any legal rights which [he] would have had if confined in . . . the 
sending state." Utah Code Ann. § 77-28a-l, Art. IV(e). As noted by the court, however, 
directly proceeding this sentence, the ICC mandates that all inmates confined pursuant to 
the Compact, "shall be treated equally with such similar inmates of the receiving state as 
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nvw be confined • * '^ t 
light of this mandate, and supported by other courts dealing with this issue, each stressing 
the requirement that "all inmates be treated equally," this Court held that ;;the ICC and 
implementing contracts do not requii e it lat the seeding state' s policies and procedures be 
n p p l k ' d I n il!( '<* i n i i i j f c s M ' ,r ,ii I ' y) \ ' '• 
This Court also addressed the tremendous administrative burdens that would be 
created by requiring Utah to learn and implement the policies and procedures of every 
irting the U 'i ^ * « • . : 
reference to security classifications, "[t]he sending state's facilities and confinement 
capabilities would not be identical to Utah's," Id. 
Si ic I: 1 strong polic) ' concerns solidified this Coin: f s coi lclusion. "that Utah should 
A common sense reading of these provisions must allow authorities having daily, 
physical custody of a transferred inmate to determine the discipline, visitation, 
classi fication, ai id grooming aspects of the inmate' s incarceration.' " 1 a at 1393, S ee also 
Sicmu \4rMitnu\ »>>l 1' 'Ml 1 IK II 111 (V," 'u | 0< i | M I I M M I I I L > H ' l t in ! 1 IIIOI|III m 
application of sending state's disciplinary rules and regulations to a transferred inmate); 
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Jaben v. Moore, 788 F.Supp. 500, 503-504 (D.Kan. 1992) (holding ICC did not require 
application of sending state' custody-classification guidelines); Cranfordv. Iowa, 471 
N.W.2d 904, 905 (Iowa Ct.App. 1991) (holding ICC does not require application of 
sending state's disciplinary rules); Daye v. Vermont, 2000WL 1880230 (Vt.) (holding 
ICC inmates not entitled to the same visitation policy in out-of-state correctional facilities 
that applied in sending state's facilities). 
II. THE TRIAL COURT, FOLLOWING ESTABLISHED 
LAW, CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT A MONTANA 
STIPULATION REGARDING THE TREATMENT OF 
INMATES INCARCERATED IN MONTANA, IS NOT A 
BINDING DOCUMENT AS TO THE TREATMENT OF 
MONTANA INMATES INCARCERATED IN UTAH 
PURSUANT TO THE ICC. 
The basis for Heaney's claim is that due to his placement in a Utah facility, with 
the accompanying classification and housing by Utah prison officials, he is being 
deprived of certain "rights" which he alleges Utah should provide him pursuant to a 
Montana stipulation. The Montana stipulation, however, deals with policy addressing 
classification, housing, programming and privileges. Clearly established case law holds 
that an inmate does not have a constitutional right to any particular prison classification. 
Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 468; Levoy v. Mills, 788 F.2d 1437,1440 (10th Cir. 1986). Moreover, 
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Click v. Holden, clearly holds that the 1< V does imf nv* , >t1;iln I Itiili appUiii^ a v. in1 hi; 
state's classification to inmates incarcerated in Utah. 889 P.2d at 1392. 
,t.cin> <..w. .i.-Mici! case lav also hold^ that an inmate does not have a 
* ,-! . . . //;. - • uL « - . 
to housing 'p rny particular portion of a pr ^ J '' 
associated programming and privileges. Templeman, 16 F.3d at 370; Wishon, 978 F.2d 
^ ...... : i.v. s ( i UL,O Click, 889 P.2dl392 (ICC does not require Utah 1.= 
lieaney ha* no "rights" \r rJnc *r> -v ^ i 
particular portion of a prison, to any particular classification, or to any particular 
programming and privileges As such, ICC's provision that an inmate should not be 
< ' > .v,,.....^ - sending 
state," is not applicable here. Utah.Code ,\nn c T7 })it I '» I III1 ll"lll,|ll,«l i 
Even in the unlikely event that Montana's stipulation provisions were seen as 
"rights," as noted by the Ligmh Circuit in reference to prison wage discrepancies between 
j -si -< -;i .. an automata consequence oi having 
been convicted in k *: x * 
incarceration," and "[t]he triggering event for the application of the Compact, 
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incarceration in another state, negates the element upon which the [right] is dependent, 
incarceration in [the sending state]." Jennings, 70 F.3d at 996. While incarcerated in 
Montana as a protective custody inmate, Heaney was subject to the Montana stipulation. 
Once incarcerated in Utah, however, that element that the stipulation was based on, 
Montana incarceration, no longer existed. Utah and Montana are separate sovereigns. 
Heaney's rights and obligation as to Montana are separate from his rights and obligation 
as to Utah. See Clemmons v. Read, 1996 WL 164408 (N.D. 111.). 
Of most import, however, is that the ICC's mandated equality of treatment 
precludes implementation of the Montana stipulation to Heaney while incarcerated in 
Utah. This stance is necessary to ensure equality of treatment between ICC inmates, and 
similarly situated Utah inmates. Moreover, as discussed earlier, strong policy 
considerations push toward this position. Utah's facilities, Utah's conditions of 
confinement, and Utah's policies, are not equipped to provide the treatment Montana has 
stipulated to provide Montana protective custody inmates incarcerated in Montana. 
Requiring Utah to learn and implement these policies and procedures, not only from 
Montana, but from every state an ICC inmate is received from, would create tremendous 
administrative burdens, which would in turn impact Utah's desire, or perhaps even Utah's 
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ability to accept ICC inmates, thereby thwarting the ICC's manifest purpose. See Glick, 
889P.2dat 1393 n.6. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT, FOLLOWING ESTABLISHED 
LAW, CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT HEANEY'S 
EIGHTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS ARE NOT VIOLATED 
WHERE HIS EXTENSIVE SAFETY CONCERNS 
NECESSITATE HOUSING HIM IN THE MOST SECURE 
AREA OF THE PRISON, CONSEQUENTLY NOT 
AFFORDING HIM THE SAME PRIVILEGES 
AFFORDED INMATES HOUSED IN THE GENERAL 
POPULATION. 
'I ni' ilnhhsli ,in I'M.'hlli Viik'iidiin'iil M'hlhui in iniikii inn; | slmu actions 
which "involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain." Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 
U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Where an inmate is provided with adequate food, clothing, and 
sanitation, the conditions of his confinement do not violate the Eighth Amendment. 
'the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities,' are suffVic--.*! rr ' -! e 
basis of an Eighth Amendment \ iolaiion.*' Wilson v. Setter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 
i • • - ,.<ni/igRhodes, -<.-. • ui 347). 
I * -i • ges nothing indicating a wanton or unnecessary infliction of pain. Nor 
is any allegation made that ho l;n*Ks proper fund clolhim1 sanitalnni m lli.it hi i , hi'ini1 
deprived of any of life's necessities. What Heaney alleges is, that due to his extensive 
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safety concerns, he is housed in an area of the prison where he is "not afforded the same 
privileges afforded the general population, i.e., visiting privileges, commissary, out of cell 
time, yard and exercise time, telephone privileges etc." (R. 14). 
Although Utah courts have not addressed this exact issue, the vast majority of 
courts, including the First, Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, uniformly hold that no 
Eighth Amendment violations exist in such instances. In Lovell v. Brennan, affirmed by 
the First Circuit, no Eighth Amendment violation was found where protective custody 
inmates were housed under more stringent conditions than the general prison population, 
with accordingly limited access to prison programs and activities. 566 F.Supp. at 690-
691. The court noted that limiting access to programming is ;ta necessary incident of 
plaintiffs' Protective Custody status." Id. 
The Fourth Circuit, in Taylor v. Rogers, held no Eighth Amendment violation 
existed where a protective custody inmate was required to forgo many of the privileges 
afforded the general population, including limitations of out-of-cell time, out-of-doors 
time, religious services, drug counseling, vocation training, other rehabilitative classes, 
visitation rights, and no organized recreational activities. 781 F.2d at 1050. 
Likewise, the Seventh Circuit held no Eighth Amendment violation existed where 
protective custody inmates did not have equal access to the same vocational, academic 
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and rehabilitation programs as the general prison population. French, 111 F.2d at 1256. 
The court, speaking of restrictions placed on protective custody inmates as being a 
function of security and order, as well as rationally furthering a legitimate state purpose 
stated: 
[t]he rationality of a distinction between privileges for prisoners in the general 
population and those in protective custody goes to the fundamental purpose of 
such segregation. Protective segregation is offered to inmates for their safety, 
the safety of others in confinement, and to insure institutional security and 
order. To allow prisoners in protective custody to enjoy all of the same 
privileges to the same degree as those in the general population would 
eviscerate the nature of protective segregation. (Emphasis added). Id. 
(quoting Allgoodv. Morris, 724 F.2d 1098, 1100-01(4th Cir. 1984)). 
In Hosna v. Groose, protective custody inmates with extensive safety concerns 
were housed in the most restrictive area of the prison with other inmates segregated due 
to discipline issues, dangerousness, proclivity for escape, etc. 80 F.3d at 301. The Eighth 
Circuit held that permitting these protective custody inmates to only exercise in an 
enclosed area, as well as limiting their out-of-cell exercise to three hours per week, did 
not violate the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 306. See also Andrews v. Gunter, 1987 WL 
54372 (D.Neb.) (no violation where limited opportunity to exercise outside cell, or 
participate in all activities available to general prison population); Crozier v. Shillinger, 
710 F.Supp. 760, 764 (D. Wyo. 1989) (Eighth Amendment not violated by suspension of 
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certain benefits and opportunities afforded general prison population); Reutcke v. Dahm, 
101 F.Supp. 1121 (D.Neb. 1988) (protective custody inmate's deprivation of general 
prison population rights did not violate Eighth Amendment); Calloway v. Fauver, 544 
F.Supp. 584, 598 (D.N.J. 1982) (protective custody inmates may be confined with more 
limited privileges than general prison population where security or compelling 
administrative needs require it).! But see Wojtczakv. Cuyler, 480 F.Supp. 1288 (E.D.Pa. 
1979) (court's reasoning rejected by the Fourth Circuit, noting "the argument has gained 
no wider acceptance," Taylor, 781 F.2d at 1050)2; Bishop v. McCoy, 323 S.E.2d 140, 145 
(W.Va. 1984)(holding based in large part on state statutes mandating educational, and 
other rehabilative programs for all inmates); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F.Supp. 956 
(D.R.I. 1977). 
Heaney's more restrictive housing does not violate his Eighth Amendment rights. 
On the contrary, his housing in the most secure area of the prison is the prison's concerted 
effort to protect such rights, since an Eighth Amendment violation may occur where a 
prison official knows i;that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards 
Upheld inmates being involuntarily held in protective custody, due to severe 
safety concerns, although court required a hearing at least once a year. 
^ o t e , this case involved only three inmates assigned to maximum security for 
protective custody. 
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that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 
825,847(1994). 
Here, prison officials have been made aware Heaney's extensive safety concerns. 
See, Exhibit 1, "Inmate Safety Concerns." In response to those extensive safety concerns, 
the prison has taken reasonable measures to assure Heaney's safety by housing him away 
from the general population in the most secure prison area available. Heaney's safety 
issues are most effectively and most efficiently addressed in the prison's maximum 
security area, an area best suited to structurally limit inmate interaction. Heaney's desire 
to "have his cake and eat it to," wanting his protection assured without any of the less 
desirable or more restrictive conditions inevitably associated with that protection, is 
simply not possible. Heaney's safety is dependant on the prison's ability to insulate him 
from the general prison population, a necessity best achieved in the prison's maximum 
security area, with its accompanying limited privileges. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT, FOLLOWING ESTABLISHED 
LAW, CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT WHERE 
HEANEY'S PRISON PLACEMENT IS A MATTER OF 
PRISON ADMINISTRATION THAT IT IS NOT THE 
COURT'S PREROGATIVE TO DIRECT THAT 
PLACEMENT. 
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Prison administrators are given wide-ranging discretion in the management of 
correctional institutions. Bell, 441 U.S. 520. 
[J]udicial deference is accorded not merely because the administrator 
ordinarily will, as a matter of fact in a particular case, have a better grasp of his 
domain than the viewing judge, but also because the operation of our 
correctional facilities is peculiarly the province of the Legislature and 
Executive Branches of our Government, not the Judicial. Id. at 548. 
Appropriate deference and flexibility ought to be afforded prison officials trying to 
manage daily affairs in what is by nature, a volatile environment. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 
482. 
'[A]t an individual prison, under the restrictions of a limited budget, prison 
officials must make hard choices. They must balance many considerations, 
ranging from the characteristics of the inmates at that prison to the size of the 
institution' to create an optimal set of privileges and restrictions. Williams v. 
Price, 25 F.Supp.2d 605,620 (W.D. Pa. 1997)(quoting//os>?a, 80 F.3d at 305). 
Most specifically, housing decisions present exactly the type of discretionary 
administrative decision that is rightfully within the expertise of correctional officials. 
Given the multitude of criteria that must be considered in such decisions, the prison's 
determination as to the most effective, the most secure, and the safest manner available to 
house the largest number of inmates, is exactly the type of administrative decision that is 
entitled judicial deference. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court's order dismissing Heaney's Petition for Extraordinary Relief and 
granting appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment should be affirmed. Since this case 
deals with claims addressed by established law, appellee does not request oral argument 
or a published opinion. J 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS dO of April 2001. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
SHAJREL S. REBER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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On^S^April 2001,1 mailed, by U.S. mail, postage prepaid, two copies of this 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE to: 
Anthony Dion Heaney 
Inmate #29150 
Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, UT 84020 
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Page 22 of 22 
ADDENDUM 1 
"Affidavit of Clint Friel" 
SHAREL S. REBER (#7966) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (#1231) 
Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
P.O. Box 140857 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857 
Telephone: (801) 366-0353 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANTHONY DION HEANEY, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
HANK GALETKA, 
Respondent. 
AFFIDAVIT OF CLINT FRTEL 
Case No. 000903408 
Judge WILLIAM B. BOHLING 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Clint Friel, under oath state the following to be true and correct to the best of my 
knowledge. 
1. I am a citizen and resident of the United States of America and the State of Utah, and I 
am over the age of eighteen (18) years. 
I am employed by the Utah Department of Corrections, as Associate Warden at the Utah 
State Prison, (prison) Draper, Utah. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated in this 
affidavit. 
My job entails inmate management, including custody and housing of the inmate 
population. 
To ensure inmate safety a "safety management policy7' has been instituted by the prison. 
Pursuant to this policy during intake and orientation an inmate is asked to identify any 
safety concerns he has with regard to other inmates, including names and why these 
individuals present a safety concern. This information is verified if possible, however, an 
inmate's safety concerns are given considerable credibility. 
Names provided by the inmate are entered into a computer data base, with this 
information then appearing on the inmate's "safety screen." This screen assures that 
an inmate's safety concerns are considered before housing assignments are made. 
These "safety concerns" remain in the data base until the inmate notifies the prison that 
they no longer exist, 01 the inmate is paroled. 
Where a large number of the inmate population presents a safety concern to an inmate, it 
becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible, to keep essentially the entire prison 
population separate from Ihe inmate at all times. The primary solution in this instance is 
to remove the inmate from the general population. Secondary options would include 
2 
placement in a county jail, or placement in another state through the Interstate 
Corrections Compact. 
Removing the inmate firom the general population can be accomplished by housing the 
inmate in the maximum security area of the prison. Facilities in this area provide for 
either single cell housing, or housing with an approved roommate. (The cells in the 
maximum security unit are the largest ones available at the prison). 
It is of vital interest and need that the prison utilizes this type of "structural intervention/' 
The prison presently houses approximately five thousand plus inmates, and the 
management of such a large population, especially with regard to inmates with broad base 
safety concerns, requires such intervention to protect these inmates from themselves, as 
well as others. 
Inmates with safety concerns within the maximum security units are housed separately 
from other inmates on that unit. In order to maintain and manage the unit, however, all of 
the inmates housed in each particular area of the maximum security unit are subject to the 
same restrictions. 
Privilege differences between inmates housed in the maximum security areas of the 
prison and those housed in the prison's general population are based on valid security and 
institutional considerations. 
Maximum security inmates are allowed fewer commissary purchases than general 
3 
population inmates. This disparity is based on the more volatile and unpredictable 
environment presented in the maximum security area of the prison, where more 
commissary purchases translate into more available contraband, which in turn translates 
into greater security threats to both inmates and staff. This consideration applies with 
equal force to safety concern inmates, as well as administrative segregation inmates, 
housed in this area. 
12. Maximum security inmates have fewer telephone and visiting privileges than general 
population inmates. This disparity is based on the additional manpower required to 
facilitate these privileges for the maximum security inmate. Security necessitates heavy, 
increased supervision for any out-of-cell time accorded a maximum security inmate. 
Similar manpower is not necessary for a general population inmate to be accorded the 
same privileges. Once again, this consideration bears equally on safety concern inmates 
as well as administrative segregation inmates. 
13. In certain areas of the maximum security section inmates are allowed out of their cells in 
their section three hours in every 24-hour period. Such limited out-of-cell time is 
necessary to assure inmate safety, due to these inmates particular security and safety 
concerns. 
14. The prison has an institutional interest in maintaining the maximum security area of the 
prison as a less appealing housing area. Due to the increased safety and security concerns 
4 
15. 
presented, operating costs in this housing area are accordingly higher. The prison has an 
institutional interest in assuring only inmates legitimately requiring such increased 
supervision are housed on this unit 
Since Petitioner's puipoited safety concerns are extensive, pursuant to policy he was 
assigned housing in a maximum security area of the prison. 
ci: j JA, . ; / 
CLINT FRIEL 
I 
I 
I. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to me this ^ day of July 2000 
x^Wft 
Notary Puowc -
LOfU H. WORTHINSTON I 
fcO. BOX 2 5 0 ^
 m MAPCa UTAH f40M I 
8tat« of Utah • 
/ NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in: SiM-Lafe GwW 
My Commission Expires: 
\s-Q"0> 
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ADDENDUM 2 
"Inmate Safety Concerns" 
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INMATE SAFETY CONCERNS 
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